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Abstract 
 
The concepts of absorptive capacity and innovative capability have been introduced to 
describe abilities of a country to imitate and, accordingly, to create more advanced technologies. 
In this paper we suggest new indicators of these two abilities. To calculate them, we develop an 
endogenous growth model and an estimation procedure that combines both calibration and 
econometric approaches.    
The choice of parameters is based on WDI, ICRG and Barro–Lee statistical data for the 
period of 1981-2005. As a result, the model generates trajectories of 63 countries and, for most 
of them, gives qualitatively correct pictures of their evolution dependently on their initial states 
as well as on their absorptive capacity and innovative capability indicators. In particular, club 
convergence is demonstrated.  The calculations affirm our hypotheses about shapes of absorptive 
capacity and innovative capability dependence on the relative productivity level, human capital, 
institutional quality and some other factors. 
Keywords: imitation,  innovation, catching-up development,  foreign direct investment, human 
capital, equilibrium, evolution of countries distribution 
JEL: O33, O41, O43, O57 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Each developing country tries to catch up with the developed world. Unfortunately, only few 
economies were able to reach this purpose during last sixty years.  Well known Gershenkon’s 
argument – “advantage of backwardness” – does not work properly in most cases 
(Gershenkon (1962)).  Though imitations of technologies and governance methods are much 
cheaper than innovations, the imitation process is also costly and requires sophisticated 
approaches of choosing and harmonizing different kinds of economic policies.  
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     Different abilities of countries to imitate and to innovate are reflected in the concepts of 
absorptive capacity and innovative capability.  
   The concept of absorptive capacity has been originally introduced as a characteristic of a 
firm, namely its "ability to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends" (Cohen, Levinthal, 1990).  Later on, this concept was applied to a 
country as a whole. The imitation process is understood in a broad sense including a choice of 
technology (or a method of governance), an acquisition of the rights to use it, its adaptation to 
the conditions of the recipient’s country, its modification and, possibly, some improvements.  
    L. Suarez-Villa was probably the first one who has used (in 1990) a concept of 
innovative capability (see http://www.innovativecapacity.com). In Furman, Porter, Stern 
(2002, p.1), it is defined as “the ability of a country – as both a political and economic entity – to 
produce and commercialize a flow of innovative technology over the long term». 
Modeling of imitation and innovation processes constitute the core of modern theories of 
endogenous economic growth (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Aghion, Howitt, 1998; 
Acemogly, Aghion, Zilibotti, 2002a,b).    It is widely believed that absorptive capacity is a main 
determinant of successful catching-up development.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, up to now there is neither general strict 
definitions of the absorptive capacity and innovative capability nor convincing methodology to 
measure them.   
There are a number of papers that try to find main determinants of economic growth (see 
Barro (1991), and again Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998) for surveys). 
However, different factors play different roles at different stages of development.  Successful 
catching-up is possible only if appropriate policies are implemented at each stage and switching 
from one policy to another one is made in time (Acemoglu, Aghion,  Zilibotty (2002 a), 
Polterovich, Popov ( 2006a,b),   Unido (2005)). 
Possibilities to arrange good policies depend on our knowledge of absorptive capacity 
and innovative capability as well as on factors which influence both quantities. However, the 
task to separate and measure two abilities is not trivial. Instead, a number of researches try to 
suggest indicators that characterize technological capabilities of countries. In Archibugi , Coco 
(2005), authors describe and compare five  indicators developed by The World Economic Forum 
(WEF), the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), and the RAND Corporation, and then they suggest their own measure of technological 
capability, ArCo. All these indicators are based on a set of country characteristics and, 
unfortunately, on “arbitrary weighting schemes with limited theoretical or empirical bases” 
(World Bank, 2008).  
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For example the index of innovation capability is published by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and consists of an unweighted average of an 
index of human capital (a weighted average of tertiary and secondary school enrollment rates 
and the literacy rate) and a technological activity index (an unweighted average of three per 
capita indicators: R&D personnel, U.S. patents granted, and scientific publications). 
Rank correlations between indicators are high enough (not less than 0.85) though for 
some countries big divergence is observed. For example, Israel ranks 3rd by ArCo, but it ranks 
7th by RAND, 21st according to WEF, and 18th according to UNDP (Archibugi , Coco (2005), 
p. 186).  
In UNIDO (2005), weights were chosen through factor analysis that was carried out on 
29 indicators, and five principal factors were labeled as knowledge, inward openness, financial 
system, governance, and the political system. The first factor correlates highly with R&D and 
innovation, scientific publications, information and communications technology infrastructure, 
production certifications and education. Inward openness means imports and inward FDI. 
Financial system composite indicator reflects market capitalization, country risk and access to 
credit. Then, these factors as well as nine geographical, cultural and natural resource indicators 
were taken as regressors for growth rate. The sample included data on 135 countries for two 
three years periods: 1992-1994 and 2000-2002. Only financial system, governance, knowledge 
and/or their increments were found to be significant.   
A similar methodology has been used in World Bank (2008). As much as 34 variables 
were used over the 1990–2006 period. To calculate overall index of technological absorptive 
capacity four types of characteristics were taken into account:  Macroeconomic environment 
(general government balance,  CPI inflation rate,  real exchange rate volatility); Financial 
structure and intermediation (liquid liabilities, private credit, financial system deposits); Human 
capital (primary educational attainment, percent of population aged 15 and secondary 
educational attainment percent of population aged 15; tertiary educational attainment percent of 
population aged 15); Governance (Voice and accountability,  Political stability, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory quality;  Rule of law).  
What are the problems these indicators may help to solve?  The answer is not quite clear. 
Nevertheless Archibugi and Coco write : “Both policy analysts and academic researchers need 
new and improved measures of technological capabilities on the performance of nations to 
understand economic and social transformations. With regard to policy analysis, this has 
relevance for public and business practitioners. Governments constantly require information 
about the performance of their own country, and this is often better understood in comparison to 
the performance of their partners and competitors” (Archibugi and Coco , 2005, pp.175-176). 
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The short survey above demonstrates that, up to now, there are neither general strict 
definitions of absorptive capacity and innovative capability nor convincing methodology to 
measure them. This paper tries to fill in this gap. 
In this paper we try to build indicators that could not only serve for comparisons of 
different countries technology levels but also could help to choose most efficient    direction to 
invest.  
Having in mind this goal we introduce the following definitions. 
The absorptive capacity of an economy is defined as the cost of 1% increase of its TFP 
through technology transfer from other economies.   
Analogously, the innovative capability of an economy is defined as the cost of 1% 
increase of its TFP through technology innovation. 
In both definitions, the cost may be measured as percentage of GDP or capital of a 
country. 
In this paper, the latter measure is used. 
 In these definitions, technology is understood in a broad sense as a method of 
production, trade, governance, etc.     
In what follows we will also use the terms adaptive and innovative abilities, having in 
mind that the less is absorptive capacity of a country the larger is its adaptive ability; similarly, 
the less is innovative capability of a country the larger its innovative ability.                                                                                                                          
Different kinds of policies and institutions are required to increase adaptive or innovative 
abilities. If for example adaptive ability of a country is much larger than its innovative ability 
then it is reasonable to invest into imitation projects. Thus, it is important to measure both 
abilities.  
Basing on many empirical and theoretical researches one might put forward the following six 
hypotheses about dependencies of absorptive capacity and innovative capability on different 
factors.                
1) Absorptive capacity is negatively connected with relative level of development; the higher 
is this level the larger is innovative capability.  
     The level of development is defined as a ratio of the country productivity parameter to the 
productivity of the most advanced economy. A similar assumption is used in Acemoglu, Aghion 
and Zilibotti (2002a), where the costs per unit of the productivity increase are taken to be 
constant for imitation and linear for innovation. In what follows we assume (and then check), 
that the imitation cost function increases and the innovation cost function decreases when the 
economy approaches a leader. A similar assumption about the cost of imitation may be found in 
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Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995). The reason is that less advanced economies may borrow well-
known and cheap technologies that may be obsolete for advanced economies. 
     The shape of dependence of innovation cost on development levels is more questionable. On 
one hand, decreasing rate of return might take place. On the other hand, accelerating effects of 
the technical progress occur. We will show that innovation costs are less for most advanced 
economies (see also Polterovich, Tonis (2005)). 
2) International trade positively influences absorptive capacity. 
Import and export both are channels through which new knowledge penetrates into a country. 
Import is a source of more advanced equipment. Export orientation is an incentive and an 
opportunity to apply new technologies and to study new marketing approaches.  
However, there are evidences that the influence of international trade policy on growth 
depends on institutional quality and stage of development (Rodríguez, Rodrik (2000), 
Polterovich, Popov (2006а,b)). In any case, it is not clear to what extent international trade 
volumes are connected with innovative capabilities. 
   3) Human capital has positive impact on innovative capability.  The influence of human capital 
on absorptive capacity is much less pronounced since imitation requires less creative workforce.      
       This is particularly underlined in Acemoglu, Aghion,  Zilibotti (2002a),  Vandenbussche, 
Aghion, Meghir  (2004), Rogers (2004).   The role of human capital for development was studied 
in many earlier papers ( see Lucas (1988), Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992), Nonneman, Vanhoudt  
(1996) and more references in Aghion, Howitt (1998)). However some researchers cast doubt on 
significance of human capital, measured as share of education cost in GDP or as literacy rate, for 
economic growth (see Levine, Renelt (1992) and polemics in  Sala-I-Martin (1997)).   
    4) Institutional quality positively influences both absorptive capacities and innovative 
capabilities.  
One may expect, however, that absorptive capacity is much more sensitive to this factor than 
innovative capability: innovations start to play substantial role at higher levels of development 
when institutional quality is strong enough so that its additional enhancing does not give any 
substantial effect.   
  5) Foreign direct investment may be an effective channel of enhancing absorptive capacity. 
However, they may be harmful as well if institutional quality is low and regulation is not rational 
enough (Kinoshita Y. (2008)). 
  6) Banking system is more important for imitation whereas financial markets play decisive role 
for innovative development.   
   This is a conclusion from a number of researches (see  Chakraborty, Ra (2006), Deidda, 
Fattouh (2008)). 
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In what follows we try to check these hypotheses. 
     To be reliable, the measurement method has to be based on a model which is able to 
reproduce a general picture of world economic development. We use data sets for 63 countries 
and the time period 1980-2006, and find that this picture is complicated enough.  Advanced 
economies seem to be converging to each other. Another converging group includes a number of 
Latin American and some other countries with 15-30% of the USA GDP per capita. These two 
groups seem to be growing with almost equal rates whereas most of African countries fall 
behind. It looks like world income is moving toward a distribution with two peaks. This 
observation, made by Quah (1993), gave birth to a number of research about ”club 
convergence”. 
      Some explanations of this phenomenon may be got in framework of underdevelopment or 
poverty trap theories. There are four different classes of development trap models that consider 
the trap as a result of a lack of physical capital, human capital, productivity, and low quality of 
economic and political institutions (see Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Feyrer (2003) for a 
survey and references). 
    Easterly, Levine (2001), and Feyrer (2003) found, however, that factor accumulation can not 
explain two peaks distribution: “the output per capita is tending toward twin peaks despite the 
tendency toward convergence in the accumulable factors. The productivity residual, on the other 
hand, shows movement similar to the distribution of per capita output...” (Feyrer (2003), p.31). 
Thus, interactions between innovation and imitation processes and institutional development 
should play dominant roles in modeling of the club convergence behavior. 
   The interactions were studied in a number  of papers (see Segerstrom (1991), Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1995), Aghion , Howitt(1998),  Henkin, Polterovich (1999) for surveys, and also 
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002),  Polterovich, Tonis 
(2003, 2005)).  
     In this paper we consider two modifications of the model developed in Polterovich, Tonis 
(2003, 2005) . This model has a number of attractive features that make it a good instrument of 
measuring adaptive capacities and innovative capabilities. 
a). It is not assumed, as it is done in many other papers, that a country always imitates the most 
advanced technology. Every developing country experiences a lot of failures connected with 
attempts of borrowing the most recent achievements of the developed world. A rational policy 
admits borrowing not only best achievements but experience of many other countries as well 
(compare Aghion, Howitt (1998, Chapter 12)). 
b). The model takes into account a difference between global and local innovations. The first 
ones may be borrowed by other countries whereas the second ones are country specific.  
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c). The model takes into account that the larger is an innovation or an imitation project, the less 
probable is its success (in accordance with Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2002). Therefore, both 
policies exhibit decreasing rate of return, and the tradeoff between innovation and imitation may 
result in producing both of them. 
d). In accordance to our model, costs of imitation and innovation in a country may depend not 
only on its relative level of development but also on a number of exogenous parameters. This 
gives a possibility to study dependence of adaptive capacity and innovative capabilities on broad 
variety of parameters.   
   e). In most investigations, steady states are studied only. However, to generate a picture that 
reproduces a real set of countries trajectories, one has to consider transition paths. To do that, we 
were forced to simplify our model drastically. The model is quasi-static and generates 
trajectories as sequences of static equilibria. The model makes use of many other simplifications 
as well. 
    It was shown that, under stationary exogenous conditions, three types of stable steady states 
are possible, where only imitation, only innovation or a mixed policy prevails.  
     It turned out that the model indeed generates a picture qualitatively similar to the real one. 
Roughly speaking, three groups of countries behave differently. There is a tendency to converge 
within each group. Countries with low institutional quality have stable underdevelopment traps 
near the imitation area. Increase in the quality moves the steady state toward a better position and 
turns into a new stable steady state where local innovations and imitations are jointly used. 
Under further institutional improvements, a combined imitation-innovation underdevelopment 
trap disappears. All countries with high quality of institutions are moving toward the area where 
pure innovation policy prevails (see Polterovich and Tonis (2005) where a model with no human 
capital is considered). 
       Below, we use this model to demonstrate how adaptive capacity and innovative capability 
can be calculated. Our method combines calibration and econometric approach. In the 
calculation process we find how adaptive ability and innovative capability depend on a broad set 
of indicators such as level of development, investment risk, international trade, human capital, 
availability of physical capital, and some others. Two key values and a few other parameters are 
chosen to reproduce trajectories of more than 60 countries from 1980 to 2006. This methodology 
permits to check, at least partially, hypothesis a)-e).  
   Our calculations are based on assumptions about the relationship between royalty receipts and 
royalty payments of a country, on the one hand, and innovation and imitation costs on the other 
hand.  
 8 
   We also suggest a modification of the model where a dynamic equation for human capital is 
introduced. It is shown that our main conclusions are stable with respect to variations of the 
model.  
  The plan of the paper is as follows.  А static model is described in the next section.  In Section 
3 we study comparative statics of the model. Section 4 contains the descriptions of a dynamic 
model. Data description, the methodology of calibrations and main results are presented in 
Sections 5-7.  Two approaches to calibration are presented. The first one (sections 5-7) is based 
on growth-based separation hypothesis:  ratio of rates of growth induced by innovations and 
imitations is proportional to royalty receipts over royalty payments. In Section 8, an alternative, 
cost-based separation hypothesis is used: the ratio of royalty receipts to royalty payments is 
proportional to the ratio of innovation to imitation costs. The results of absorptive capacity and 
innovative capability calculations are presented and discussed in Section 9.  Section 10 
concludes.  
                               
2. A static model 
  This model is a modification of a model from Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti (2002a). 
There are three kinds of goods in our economy: final good, capital and the continuum set of 
high-technology intermediate goods indexed by ν ∈ [0, 1].  
  Every period, final good is competitively produced from the intermediate goods. Each 
intermediate good ν  is characterized by its productivity Aν . The production function for the final 
good is given by 
1
0
( , )Y F NA X dν ν ν= ∫ ,                                                                                                      (1) 
where N  is the number of workers (so, NAν  is the “effective labor”), Xν is the quantity of 
intermediate good ν  involved in the production process,  and F is homogeneous  of degree 1: 
        ( , ) ( )F NA X NA f xν ν ν ν=                                                                                                        (2) 
where Xx
NA
ν
ν
ν
= ,  x ν  is the “normalized” quantity of intermediate good. Here we assume that f 
satisfies Inada conditions and xf′′(x) + f′(x) falls from ∞ to 0, as x proceeds from 0 to ∞. 
Throughout this paper, a special case of Cobb — Douglas production function will be 
considered:  
 
1( , ) ( )F NA X NA Xα αν ν ν ν
−= ⋅ , 0< 1α < . 
Then ( )f x x αν ν= .  
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We suppose that final good can be sold at price 1. The price of intermediate good ν is p ν . A 
producer of final good chooses its demand for each of intermediate goods, Xν , taking all prices 
as given, so as to maximize its profit: 
1
0
max
X
Y p X d
ν
ν ν ν− →∫                                                                                                         (3) 
From the optimality conditions, one gets the following inverse demand function: 
          ( )f x pν νʹ′ = .                                                                                                                         (4) 
    Intermediate goods can be produced from capital. The production function in the intermediate 
goods sector is assumed to be linear: one unit of capital can be converted to one unit of 
intermediate good1.  
In each sector ν ∈ [0, 1], only one firm enjoys the full access to the technology of producing the 
corresponding intermediate good, so the market for each intermediate good is monopolistic. Let 
the rental price of capital be r. Then firm’s profit Vν is given by 
( )( ) '( )V p r X NA f x r xν ν ν ν ν ν= − = − .                                                                              (5) 
The firm is facing the demand of the final good sector for its product and monopolistically 
chooses pν  so as to maximize its profitVν . 
       In each sector ν , the monopolist firm lives for one period of time. At the beginning of the 
period, each sector starts with the same (country-specific) physical capital K, human capital  H 
and productivity level A . This level represents the cumulative technological knowledge achieved 
by the economy up to that date. Prior to producing its intermediate good, a firm may spend a part 
of its future profit and a part of its physical capital to perform technological innovations and 
imitations, thus raising its productivity from A  to Aν .  Afterwards, it produces input with higher 
productivity Aν . 
It is easy to check that in the case of Cobb – Douglas production function, maximization 
of (5) entails  
2 1( ) ( ) ( )r x f x f x x xαα −ʹ′ ʹ′ʹ′= + =  ,                                                                                        (6) 
and 
( )V e x NAν ν= ,                                                                                                                    (7) 
                                                
1 We can use one-to one production function because the unit of intermediate good ν along with the technological parameter Aν  
can be properly adjusted. 
. 
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where 
2( ) ( ) (1 )e x x f x xαα αʹ′ʹ′= − = − .                                                                                              
      As follows from the above formulas, under Cobb – Douglas production function GDP is 
given by 
1( )Y NAx NA Kα α α−= =% %                                                                                                      (8) 
where 
1
0
A A dν ν= ∫%  is the average productivity level over all producers of intermediate product 
and K is the total amount of capital used in the intermediate product sector. Note that due to (8), 
A% is closely related to the total factor productivity (TFP) of the economy: the growth rate of TFP 
is  (1 – α) times the growth rate of A%. The same can be said about the initial productivity level A. 
      Now let us describe the evolution of the productivity variable (and, hence, TFP). The 
considerations above concern the domestic economy. There are also foreign countries, in which 
initial productivity levels may differ from domestic one. Denote by A  an initial productivity 
level of the most developed economy. Along with the domestic absolute productivity level A, let 
us consider the relative level Aa
A
=  which measures the distance to the world technology 
frontier. It represents the position of the domestic technologies among other ones. 
      As we mentioned above, each firm performs imitation and/or innovation prior to production. 
Let 1b  and 2b  denote, respectively, the sizes of imitation and innovation projects. Each project 
may result in one of two outcomes, success or failure. If the imitation (innovation) was 
successful, firm’s productivity rises at growth rate 1b  ( 2b ); otherwise, it remains the same. If 
both projects were successful, the productivity turns out to be 1 2(1 )(1 )b b+ +  times higher. Thus, 
after both actions, the technology parameter Aν  is given by 
                                                  1 2(1 )(1 )A Aν ξ ξ= + + ,              (9)                                                                                                
where 1ξ  ( 2ξ ) is a random variable equal to 1b  ( 2b ) in the case of successful imitation 
(innovation) of firm ν, and 0 otherwise. This multiplicative function brings about a 
complementarity effect of imitation and innovation: a progress in imitation results in greater 
marginal productivity of innovation, and vice versa. 
We postulate that probabilities of imitation and innovation success are given by the 
functions ( ),  1,2i ib iψ = :  
( ) ,  1,2ii i
i i
b i
b
µ
ψ
µ
= =
+
,  
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where 1 2( )b b  is a size imitation (innovation) project and 1 2( )µ µ  is a positive parameter. 
Naturally, larger project is more risky. The expected value of the productivity growth rate as a 
“proper” result of a project ib  is equal to ( )i i ib bψ ; iµ  may be interpreted as the expectation of 
the result of an infinitely large project . 
   Firms cannot imitate technologies which have not been developed anywhere in the world, so 
the size of the imitation project is subject to constraint 
                                1
11 b
a
+ ≤ ,                                                                                                    (10) 
where Aa
A
= . This constraint takes into account that a firm can imitate not only the most 
advanced technology but also an “intermediate” one. 
    Now let us introduce the costs of imitation and innovation. Technological development 
includes not only invention or adoption of new methods of production, but also implementation 
of these methods to the existent machinery. To adopt the costs of spreading technological 
knowledge over the economy, we assume that the costs of imitation and innovation depend not 
only on the size of the corresponding project ib , but also on the amount of capital to be upgraded. 
Specifically, in order to undertake project ib , the firm has to invest i iKq b  units of capital, where 
K is the average capital stock over the economy (equal to the capital stock of a representative 
firm). 
       It is assumed that 1q  and 2q , the per-unit costs of imitation and innovation, depend on the 
relative average productivity level of our economy (that is “a distance to the world technology 
frontier”) at the beginning of the period, and on the accumulated stock of human capital H: 
( , )i iq q a H= , iq  are continuous and differentiable. We assume also (and this is supported by 
empirical evidences) that 1q  is increasing and 2q  is decreasing in a. According to this 
assumption, it gets more difficult to imitate and easier to innovate as the domestic technology 
gets closer to the world technology frontier. Indeed, for less developed countries, it may be 
reasonable to imitate not very advanced technology which are cheaper to buy (some of them are 
not protected by intellectual property laws at all) and simpler to implement using experience 
accumulated by other countries. The innovation process is likely to exhibit some economy of 
scale due to a positive externality exerted by the stock of accumulated knowledge, so more 
advance countries incur less costs. 
     Evidently, human capital accumulation decreases the innovation costs. This is not so obvious 
for imitation costs since low level imitation does not require high level human capital.  In what 
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follows, we assume for simplicity that imitation cost, 1q  does not depend on human capital. This 
assumption  will be checked below. 
     Generally, 1q  and 2q   may depend on some other country-specific parameters as well. In the 
empirical section, we consider iq  as functions of savings rates and indicators of institutional 
quality. 
    Both forms of technological development are modeled in a similar way here. However, the 
opportunities for imitation and innovation change in different directions as a increases. In 
particular, when a  is close to 1, there is almost nothing to imitate. This is taken into account by 
constraint (10). 
   Under the above assumptions, the expected profit of the firm ν  (net of technology investment 
expenditures) is given by 
           ( )1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )E E V rZ E V rK q a b q a H bν ν ν νΠ = − = − + ,                                              (11) 
where Vν  is given by (5), the expectation is taken over the four possible realizations of 
success/failure of innovation/imitation. Hν  is the amount of human capital used by firm ν , and 
Z  is the total expected amount of physical capital invested in innovation and imitation: 
                     ( )1 1 2 2( ) ( , )Z K q a b q a H bν= + .                                                                               (12) 
In the beginning of each period, the firm chooses 1b  and 2b  to maximize its expected net profit 
(11). We assume that H ν does not depend on ν: Hν= H  for all ν . 
In what follows we assume that firms’ demand for human capital is satisfied, and do not 
take into account the costs of physical capital involved in human capital increase. 
Denote 
1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( ),   ( ) (1 ( ) ),   1,2i i i i iw b b w b w b w b b b iψ= = + = ,                                               (13) 
and let Kk
NA
=  – per capita capital stock over the initial productivity.  
Then, taken into account (7), (9), (10), (11) and (13), the firm maximization problem may 
be written as follows.  
( )1 2 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ( , ) ) maxE NA e x w b b r x k q a b q a H bνΠ = − + → ,                                (14) 
1 10 b b≤ ≤ , 2 0b ≥ ,                                                                                                           (15) 
where 1
1 1b
a
= − . 
  In view of (6) and (8), one has 
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2
2 1
( ) ( ) (1 ) 1 1 ,   0
( ) ( ) ( )
e x x f x x x x
r x f x xf x x
α
α
α α
η η
α α−
ʹ′ʹ′ − ⎛ ⎞= − = = − = >⎜ ⎟ʹ′ ʹ′ʹ′+ ⎝ ⎠
,                                     (16)  
where 1/ 1η α= − . Therefore, (14) is equivalent to the following problem:     
 1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) [ ( ) ( , ) ] maxxw b b k q a b q a H bη − + → .     (17) 
          In accordance to (17), and (9), a firm, having capital K and human capital H in a state a, 
spends ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 ( ,  ) Z K q a b q a H b= + , chooses b1, b2, and demands X NA xν ν=  capital units. In 
equilibrium, one has to get  
                                      
K X Z= +  , or 1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) [ ( ) ( , ) ]k xw b b k q a b q a H b= + + ,                                                (18) 
where 
1
0
X X dν ν= ∫ , 
Kk
NA
= . 
An equilibrium is defined as a triple 1 2, ,x b b  such that the pair 1 2( , )b b  is a solution of (17), (15) 
under given x , and equality (18) holds.  
     We assume that the equilibrium exists and is unique. 
     In the framework of the model described above, absorptive capacity and innovative capability 
may be calculated as c1= q1b1 , c2= q2b2 where projects  b1 , b2  each gives  1% increase of TFP 
of a capital unit. This means b1ψ1( b1)=0.01(1 – α)–1 , b2ψ2( b2)=0.01(1 – α) –1. Therefore,  
 
                             1 10.01(1 ) / ( 0.01(1 ) ), 1,2i i i ic q iα µ µ α
− −= − − − = .                                (19) 
 
Formula (19) will be used to measure the absorptive capacity and innovative capability of 
countries. 
 
3. Analysis of the static model 
 
    Let us denote  
( )
2
2
( )( ) ( ) ( ) = ,    1,2i i ii i i i i i i
i i i
dw bb b b b i
db b
µ
ϕ ψ ψ
µ
ʹ′= = + =
+
,                                  (20) 
and write down the first order conditions for the problem (17), (15). 
          2 2 1 1 1     ( ) ( ) ( )x w b b kq aη ϕ⋅ ≤ ,                                                                                (21) 
1 1 2 2 2               ( ) ( ) ( , )x w b b kq a Hη ϕ⋅ ≤ ,                                                                          (22) 
   If an inequality holds in (21)-(22) then a related variable  0ib =  or H Hν = .  
In view of (21), (22), equilibrium values of the function 
 14 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2( , ) = ,   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )
Z kz b b q a b q a H b w b b b w b b b
NAx x
ν
ν ν
η ϕ ϕ= + = +                (23) 
do not depend on ,x Hν ν . Therefore, the balance condition (18) takes the form 
( )( )
( ) ( )
i i i i
i i
i i i i
b b bR b
w b S b
ϕ
= = ,    ( )1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )k x w b b z b bν= + ,                                                      (24) 
 
where ).(/)()( iiiiii bbwbS ϕ=  
  The following system of equations follows from (21) – (22), (24) and determines an interior 
equilibrium. 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )1 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
w b w b b bb
q a b b w b
ϕ
ηϕ ϕ
= + + ,                                                                          (25) 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1
2
2 2 2 2 2 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )1  
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
w b w b b bb
q a H b b w b
ϕ
ηϕ ϕ
= + + ,                                                                   (26) 
Let us define: 
1
1
1 Q ( )
( )
a
q a
= ,  2
2
1( , )
( , )
Q a H
q a H
= ,                                                                               
(27) 
2
( ) ( )( )( ) ,    1,2
( )
i i i i i i i i
i i
i i i
w b b b bS b i
b
µ µ µ
ϕ µ
+ + +
= = = ,   ( )( ) / ( )
( )
i i i
i i i i i
i i
b bR b b S b
w b
ϕ
= = .                   (28) 
 
  Then one gets from (25), (26)  
  
1 1 1 2 2 1 Q ( ) ( )[1/ ( )]a S b R b bη= + + ,                                                                                                        (29) 
 
2 2 2 1 1 2 Q ( , ) ( )[1/ ( )]a H S b R b bν η= + + .                                                                                                (30) 
  
   Assume that bi are not too large so that Ri are increasing functions. Then right-hand sides of (29), (30) 
both are increasing in each bi ; Q1 is decreasing in a;  Q2  is increasing in both variables. Differentiating 
(29), (30), it is easy to check that  1( , )b a H , is decreasing ina , 2 ( , )b a H  is increasing in a , and both 
functions are increasing in H . 
       Thus, we have proved the following statement: 
       Consider the interior solution case, and let b1, b2 be not too large for some a. Then there exists a 
segment of a where b1(a) is decreasing and  b2(a) is increasing in a. 
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       This comparative statics result is analogous to Proposition 1 in Pikulina (2009), where firms 
rationally choose the amount of human capital. 
4. Dynamic model 
      We consider a quasi-dynamic model that generates trajectories by iterations of the static 
model described above. Thus it is assumed that firms have one period horizon, and that all of 
them get the average (expected) technology A% that were found at a previous period but partially 
depreciated2. Therefore, 
               1 (1 )A Aρ+ = − %,            1 (1 )A Aρ+ = − %                                                    (31) 
where 
1
1 1 1 2 2 20
(1 ( ) )(1 ( ) )A A d b b b b Aν ν ψ ψ= = + +∫%  and ρ is the knowledge depreciation rate      
(0 ≤ρ ≤ 1). 
Assume that output Y of the final good producers is taxed to finance education sector. Let 
( )aτ be the education tax rate depending on a. It is simple to check (see formulas (3)-(5), (11)) 
that this tax does not influence the choice of projects b1 , b2 so that equations (25), (26) hold. 
      We assume that the evolution of human capital H is subject to the following equation:  
1 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )HN H NH m a a Yδ τ+ + = − + ,                                                                               (32) 
where δH is the human capital depreciation rate (0 ≤ δH ≤ 1),  ( )m a  is a multiplier measuring the 
impact of education on human capital. 
       Here A+1 , H+1  play the same role for the next-period firms as A, H  for the current-period 
firms. In each period, all firms start from the same initial productivity and human capital due to 
assumed total spillovers of technology and human capital among sectors. The assumptions about 
one period horizon as well as about independence of industry’s future productivity level on its 
current innovation/imitation efforts seem to be very restrictive. In particular, the model does not 
describe the behavior of long-run investors. To eliminate these shortcomings, one could use an 
OLG model. In this case, however, it would be difficult to investigate transition dynamics rather 
than steady states.  
     To finish with the description of the model, we need to specify, how labor and capital evolve 
over time. We assume that the number of workers N  grows at a constant rate Ng : 
     1 (1 )NN g N+ = + , 
where N and 1N+  denote the number of workers, respectively, in the current and the next period. 
                                                
2Note that despite all Aν are stochastic, their average A% is non-random because the set of sectors is 
continual.  
 16 
       Let K and 1K+  be the capital stocks at the current period and the next one, respectively. We 
assume that the next-period capital stock is determined by the following equation 
1 (1 ) (1 ( ))KK K a Yδ σ τ+ = − + −                                                             (33) 
where [0,1]Kδ ∈  is the capital depreciation rate, Y is the total output of the final good, and 
[0,1]σ ∈   is a (constant) saving rate. Parameter σ  is assumed to be country-specific. It may 
depend on the quality of institutions and investment climate in the country. We also assume that 
ρ < δK , i. e. physical capital depreciates faster than technology. 
      A dynamic equilibrium in the model is defined as a sequence of variables {Kt , At , xt , Ht , b1t , 
b2t}t  such that, in each period t,  four quantities 1 2, , ,t t t tx H b b   form a static equilibrium under 
1tK − , 1tA − , 1tH − , and evolution equations (31)-(33) hold. 
     To summarize, the economy evolves as follows. At the beginning of the period, all firms in a 
country start from the same productivity level A. Firms choose the sizes of their imitation and 
innovation projects which maximize their profits. Then random events are realized; success or 
failure of these projects and, correspondingly, random values Aν turn out to be known. 
Production takes place and profits are revealed. The next-period productivity level, human and 
physical capital stocks are determined.  All next-period firms start their projects from the new 
productivity level. They make their innovations and imitations determining their successors’ 
productivity level, and so on.  
Assume that the productivity of the most developed country A  increases with a constant 
growth rate g . Then 
( )
( )
1
1
1
1 21 ( , )
1
w b b AAa
A g A
ρ+
+
+
−
= =
+
 or 1 21
( , )w b ba a
γ+
= ,             (34) 
where 1
1
g
γ
ρ
+
=
−
.  
Equation (33) takes the following form:  
( )
1
1
1 1 1 2
(1 ) (1 ( ))
(1 ) 1 ( , )
K
N
K K a Yk
N A g w b b A
δ σ τ
ρ
+
+
+ +
− + −
= =
+ −
, or 
( ) 1 2
1
(1 ( )) ( ) (1 )
(1 ) 1 ( , )
K
N
a f x kk
g w b b
σ τ δ
ρ+
− + −
=
+ −
.         (35) 
     In addition to the model described above, another, simplified version of the model will be 
considered. The only difference of the simplified model from the original one is that the 
evolution of H  is given exogenously rather than determined by (32); in this case, ( )aτ  is 
supposed to be zero. This model is equivalent to the model presented in Polterovich and Tonis 
(2005). The two versions of the model will be referred to as the model with, respectively, 
endogenous and exogenous human capital.  
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     A stationary equilibrium for the model with exogenous human capital is defined as a dynamic 
one at which variables k  and a  are not changing over time (and exogenous human capital H  is 
also stationary). As follows from (34) and (35), equations for a stationary equilibrium take the 
form 
1 2( , )w b b γ= ,                           (34’) 
( ) 1 2
(1 ( )) ( )
(1 ) 1 ( , ) (1 )N K
a f xk
g w b b
σ τ
ρ δ
−
=
+ − − −
.                      (35’) 
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
kx
w b b z b b
=
+
             (24’) 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )1 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
w b w b b bb
q a b b w b
ϕ
ηϕ ϕ
= + + ,                                                                        (25’) 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1
2
2 2 2 2 2 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )1  
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
w b w b b bb
q a H b b w b
ϕ
ηϕ ϕ
= + + ,                                                                 (26’) 
 
An important question is whether a given stationary equilibrium is stable or not. If it is stable, 
then convergence takes place within the corresponding group of countries. Otherwise, the 
equilibrium marks the boundary between the attraction areas of different centers of convergence. 
Stability conditions for stationary equilibria under exogenous human capital are established in 
Polterovich and Tonis (2005). 
     Proposition (Polterovich and Tonis, 2005). Consider a stationary equilibrium, at which 
1 1b b< . Then 
1. If there is no innovation in equilibrium, then the equilibrium is asymptotically stable. 
2. If there is no imitation in equilibrium, then the equilibrium is unstable. 
3. If both imitation and innovation are present in the equilibrium, then its stability is 
depends on the relation between the absolute values of 1q a
∂
∂  and 
2q
a
∂
∂ : if 
2
1
/
/
q a
q a
−∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 
is high, then the stationary equilibrium is unstable; otherwise, it is stable.  
 
     A stable stationary equilibrium may be considered as prediction of long-run development of 
the economy. In some cases, there could be multiple stable stationary equilibria. Country-
specific exogenous parameters affecting the normalized cost functions (institutional quality, 
international trade and so on) thereby influence possible stable stationary equilibria – not only 
their position but even their structure: steady states may emerge or vanish. Even if the 
equilibrium structure does not change, the long-run outcome may change substantially. For 
example, if a country is within the area of attraction of a stationary equilibrium with low a, but 
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close to the upper boundary of this area, a short-run positive shock of exogenous parameters may 
get it out of the trap. 
     Note that under endogenous human capital, there is no natural concept of stationary 
equilibrium, because equation (32) suggests that Hh
A
=  is to be stationary over time, so that 
1 2( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )A HN
m a a w b b f xh
g g
τ
δ
=
+ + − −
,                                                          (32’) 
 whereas according to (26’), 2b  depends on H  rather than on h . There could be a stationary 
equilibrium, if 2b  were depending on h . Note also that when we calibrate the model, a proper 
interpretation of human capital is needed: what H  (or h ) is? If human capital is measured in 
schooling years, as in Barro – Lee dataset used here, then it cannot grow exponentially as H  
does in a stationary equilibrium. Not only the duration but also the quality of education should be 
taken into account, if we want to calibrate stationary regimes. 
 
5. Calibration of the model: data and methodology 
 
Sections 5–9 give an empirical adjustment of the model considered above. We are going to test 
some of basic assumptions of the model (in particular, those concerning the per-unit cost 
functions of innovation and imitation) and to adjust the parameters of the model to the statistical 
data. Our approach to empirical investigation combines two methods: estimation of a linear 
regression model (calculating TFP and estimating the normalized cost functions for imitation and 
innovation) and non-linear optimization procedure used for calibration of “basic” parameters of 
the model.  
      One of the most important questions concerning calibration of the model is how to calculate 
proxies for 1q  and 2q , the normalized costs of imitation and innovation. Saying this by a 
different way, we have to separate TFP growth effects of imitation and innovation. As follows 
from the previous section (see (25) and (26)), 1q  and 2q  can be calculated, if we know which 
part of the growth rate can be explained by imitation and which one by innovation. Obtaining 
this information from regular cross-country data is a non-trivial problem. We suggest using the 
ratio of royalty receipts over royalty payments to deal with it (with bought licenses being a proxy 
for the result of imitation and sold ones for innovation). We suggest also two alternative ways to 
separate imitation-based and innovation-based growth. One way called “growth-based 
separation” divides the growth rate proportionally to the royalty-receipts-payments ratio. 
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Another way entails such separation that the ratio of imitation costs to innovation costs is 
proportional to the royalty-receipts-payments ratio. 
     The estimation process consists of a preliminary stage and an iteration cycle. At the 
preliminary stage, TFP is calculated using basic national account data (GDP, population, capital, 
investment) and initial values of basic parameters are set. Then a cyclical routine starts.  Given 
the basic parameters and the data on royalty receipts and royalty payments 1q  and 2q  are 
calculated. Then the normalized cost functions are estimated using regressions with 1q  and 2q  as 
dependent variables and a number of explanatory variables. After the set of regression 
coefficients is derived, the dynamic model of Section 4 (or similar) is run with the estimated cost 
functions. The predictive quality of the dynamic model is used as a criterion based on which the 
basic parameters are corrected and a new loop starts until the error of prediction becomes close 
to minimum. A more detailed description of the algorithm will be given later on. 
     We use data from the following sources: World Development Indicators (WDI, 2008), 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2004), physical capital stock dataset (Nehru and 
Dhareshwar, 1993), Barro-Lee dataset on human capital. The data structure is as follows: 
 
Y  – GDP, years 1980, ,2006… , 180 countries; source: WDI; 
N  – population, years 1980, ,2006… , 188 countries; source: WDI; 
I  – gross fixed capital formation, years 1980, ,2006… , 173 countries; source: WDI; 
K  – capital stock, years 1980, ,1990… , 89 countries; source: Nehru and Dhareshwar; 
R  – ICRG composite risk index, measure of the institutional quality, years 1984, ,2003… , 
129 countries; source: ICRG; [ ]0,100R∈ ; R  is higher for lower risks; 
BL  – royalty payments, total value of licenses bought, years 1980, ,2006… , 123 countries; 
source: WDI; 
SL  – royalty receipts, total value of licenses sold, years 1980, ,2006… , 88 countries; 
source: WDI; 
T  – manufactures trade (export+import) , years 1980, ,2006… , 164 countries; source: WDI; 
B – domestic credit provided by banking sector, years 1980, ,2006… , 180 countries; 
source: WDI; 
F – foreign direct investment, years 1980, ,2006… , 172 countries; source: WDI; 
P – the number of scientific publications per 1000 people, years 1981, ,2005… , 182 countries; 
source: WDI;  
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H  – total years of schooling (age 15+), measure of human capital stock, years 1980, ,2000… , 
111 countries; source: Barro-Lee dataset. 
ED – public spendings on education, years 1990-2006, 105 countries; source: WDI; 
 
Using WDI data on GDP, all these variables (except for N , R , P  and H ) are put to the same 
unit of measure, namely, constant 2005 international $ (adjusted to PPP).  
 
In order to smooth fluctuations, we have averaged the data by 9 three-year periods (1980-
1982,…,2004-2006). The time subscript refers to the median year of the corresponding three-
year period: for example, 1981Y  for period 1980-1982 and so on. 
     Using the above data, we are going to calibrate our dynamic model, i. e. estimate its 
parameters so as to obtain good quality of prediction. We consider two versions of our model: a 
simplified one where human capital is considered as an exogenous parameter and a full version 
with endogenous human capital, as in Section 4. 
    We assume also that the per-unit cost functions of innovation and imitation 1q  and 2q  depend 
not only on a  but also on country-specific variables N ,H , R , I , T , B , F  and P .  We are 
going to estimate these functions parametrically: we assume that they are quasi-polynomial 
functions determined by an array of coefficients β  which is to be estimated. The specific form 
of the cost functions and their coefficients β  will be defined later on. 
     So, the calibration of the model involves estimating the following parameters: 
 
α  – the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function; 
1µ  – maximal growth rate due to imitation; 
2µ  – maximal growth rate due to innovation; 
ρ  – technology obsolescence rate; 
λ  – adjustment ratio used for estimating the share of innovation and imitation in TFP growth 
(see below); 
β  – a set of regression coefficients of two cost functions 1q  and 2q  (with dependent variables 
listed above: relative level of development, population, human capital etc). Coefficients β  are 
found using the OLS method. 
     Parameters 1µ , 2µ , ρ  and λ  are called “basic” and are estimated using a non-linear 
optimization procedure. The other parameters are estimated using regressions. 
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     To obtain plausible results, we need to suggest estimators for the above parameters so as to 
reproduce the actual growth dynamics in various countries. To measure the level of country’s 
development, we use its relative per capita GDP y  which can be defined as the ratio of country’s 
per capita GDP to that of the USA: 
 
/
/USA USA
Y Ny
Y N
=  
 
We start from 1981y , the relative per capita GDP in 1981 (corresponding to the earliest period 
1980-1982 in our data series) and, using the dynamic model, try to predict 2005y , the relative per 
capita GDP in 2005 (corresponding to the latest period 2004-2006). There are many possible 
ways to measure the quality of prediction. Here we use the minimal sum of squares criterion:  the 
sum of squares of logarithmic errors 
 
( )22005 2005ˆln( ) ln( )E y y= −∑  
 
should be minimized, where 2005y  and 2005yˆ  are, respectively, the actual and the predicted 
relative per capita GDP values. 
     The problem of minimizing E  as a function of the parameters is difficult because of its large 
dimension. To simplify the problem, we decompose it into three stages. At the first, preliminary 
stage, we estimate α , the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function, from the standard 
growth regression and calculate the productivity variable. The second and the third stage are 
repeated cyclically. At the second stage, we fix the basic parameters 1µ ,  2µ , ρ , λ  and 
calculate 1q , 2q  using ,B SL L  and the basic parameters. Then we estimate β  as the set of 
coefficients in two regressions with dependent variables 1q  and 2q  and explanatory variables a , 
N ,H , R , I , T , B , F , P  (so β  is a function of the basic parameters).  At the third stage, all 
these data are put into the dynamic model and it is iterated starting from 1981y  and predicting 
2005y . Here the basic parameters are given; coefficients β  are determined at the second stage; 
variables N , R , I , T , B , F , P  (and H  in the case of exogenous human capital) are taken 
from the statistical data; a  (and H  in the case of endogenous human capital) is calculated for 
the previous 3-year period (for 1981 – taken from the data). Then the second and the third stages 
are repeated for slightly perturbed values of the basic parameters in order to calculate the 
gradient of prediction quality E  which determines the direction of adjusting the basic 
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parameters. Then basic parameters are changed in the direction opposite to the gradient and the 
procedure returns to the second stage. Thereby, the basic parameters 1µ ,  2µ , ρ  and λ  are 
calibrated through minimization of E . 
     Such decomposition of the calibration problem not only simplifies the process of calibration 
but also allows estimation of statistical significance of factors contributing to the absorptive 
capacity and innovative capability. A seeming disadvantage of this method is that its result is not 
an exact solution to the calibration problem because at the first stage, not E  but other function is 
minimized (actually, the sum of squares of errors in regression for each of iq  is minimized). In 
fact, we restrict our opportunities for adjustment getting in return for an opportunity to interpret 
key results at intermediate stages, and, in the case of success, to get higher confidence that the 
success is not occasional.    
     Now we are going to describe the procedure in more detail. Let us start with a description of 
the first stage. We need to decompose the per capita GDP growth rate into three components: 
growth due to capital accumulation, innovation and imitation. Firstly, we need to extract the 
growth rate of the total factor productivity from the annual per capita GDP growth rate. In period 
1984,1987, ,2005t = K , the latter is given by 
 
1/3
3 3
/ 1
/
t t
t
t t
Y Ng
Y N− −
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Due to our assumption about the Cobb-Douglas form of the production function, GDP can be 
represented as follows (see (8)): 
 
( )1Y NA Xα α−= % , 
 
where X  is the amount of capital used in production and A% is the average productivity level 
proportional to the TFP. Denote by Xg  the growth rate of 
X
N
, the per capita value of the 
intermediate good, and by Kg , the growth rate of 
K
N
 the capita stock per capita. According to 
the model, X  is equal to the total capital stock K  less the imitation and innovation expenditures 
which constitute a small share of K . So, Kg  could be a good proxy for Xg . Hence, as follows 
from the standard growth accounting considerations, α  can be estimated from the following 
growth regression: 
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ln(1 ) ln(1 ) constKg gα+ = + +         (36) 
 
We have found systematic cross-country data on capital stock only for the period until 1990. For 
more recent years, we have to apply the perpetual inventory estimation3 method using the 
recursive formula of capital stock evolution: 
 
1 (1 )t K t tK K Iδ+ = − + , 
 
where Kδ , the rate of physical capital depreciation, is estimated from the capital stock data 
before 1990.  The estimated levels of δ  for different countries vary from 2% to 7%, with 
average 4.13% per year4. 
 
It can be seen from the data that the expenditures on imitation and innovation (R&D and 
royalties) constitute a small part of GDP, typically, less than 2%, so we can put X K=  for 
simplicity. Thus, to extract the productivity, we use the following formula: 
 
1
1YA
K
α
α
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
% , 
 
where α  can be found from regression (36). In our computations, the estimate for α  is close 
to 0.50. 
     Based on A%, we construct some other country-specific variables useful for our analysis: 
 
USA
Aa
A
=
%% %  – relative productivity level (compared to that of the USA), a measure for the distance 
to the frontier; 
ln( )a a=( %; 
31
(1 )
t
t
t
Aw
Aρ
+=
−
%% %  – a proxy for productivity growth factor w  in the model (actually, w w=% , 
when the productivity growth in the current period is equal to that in the next one). 
                                                
3 This method is used in a number of papers on growth accounting (e. g., see Bosworth and Collins, 2003 or 
Senhadji, 2000). 
4 Values of δ  typically used in growth accounting calculations are within 4-5%. 
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Now let us turn to the second stage, the estimation of 1q  and 2q , using the WDI data on 
royalties5. Firstly, we need to separate the imitation and innovation components of the 
productivity growth factor w% based on the values of bought and sold licenses. As it has been 
already said, we use two alternative ways of separation: growth-based and cost-based. Under 
growth-based separation, the following heuristic formula is used:  
2 11 ( 1)S
B
Lw w
L
λ
− = −% % .                      (38) 
This is an important hypothesis:  ratio of TFP rates of growth induced by innovations and 
imitations is proportional to royalty receipts over royalty payments. We have no 
microfoundations behind this hypothesis. Implicitly, it describes a mechanism by which 
domestic knowledge, embodied into royalty receipts, and foreign knowledge, embodied into 
royalty payments, both influence domestic rate of growth.  
     In Section 8, an alternative method of determining contributions of imitation and innovation 
will be presented. We call it cost-based separation. Under cost-based separation, the ratio of 
royalty receipts to royalty payments is proportional to the ratio of innovation to imitation costs 
rather than growth rates.  
     Since 1 ( )i i iw b bψ= + % %% , one gets 
( 1)
1
i i
i
i i
wb
w
µ
µ
−
=
+ −
%% %, 
where ib%are proxies for ib . 
    If a country is so close to the world technology frontier that the size of the imitation project 1b% 
exceeds the feasible level (that for which the imitated technology does exist), then 1b% and 2b% are 
recalculated so as to satisfy this requirement (see (13)). 
Now from the first-order conditions for the firm’s optimal choice of 1b  and 2b , we obtain 1q% 
and 2q% which are proxies for 1q  and 2q : 
 
2
1 2
1
1
1
wq
b
η
µ
=
⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
%% % ;  12 2
2
2
1
wq
b
η
µ
=
⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
%% % .        (39) 
 
                                                
5 We also have WDI data on R&D spending but they cover only a short recent period 1996-2005, so we do not use 
them. 
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Our next task is to estimate 1q  and 2q  as functions of the phase variable a% (relative level of 
technology) and exogenous variables6 H  (human capital), R  (institutional quality), I  
(investment), T  (total manufactures trade), B  (total bank credits), F  (foreign direct investment) 
and P  (scientific publications),   taking parameters 1µ , 2µ , ρ  and λ  as given.  
   In order to make the distribution of our variables proper for the regression model and avoid 
multi-collinearity, we construct new variables N
(
,H
(
, R
(
, T
(
, I
(
, B
(
, F
(
 and P
(
: 
 
ln( )N N=
(
; 
H
(
 – residual in OLS regression 1 constH aε= +% ; 
R
(
 – residual in OLS regression 2 constR aε= +% ; 
ln( / )T T Y=
(
; 
/I I Y=
(
 (according to the (33), ( )1 ( )I aτ σ= −
(
); 
      ln( / )B B K=
(
; 
/F F Y=
(
. 
 
Thus, for H  and R , modified variables are used instead of the initial ones; H
(
 can be treated as 
the deviation of the human capital from the “standard” level (average for the given level of a%) 
and analogously for R
( 7. The regressions used for construction of these variables are as follows. 
 
Table 1. Regressions for H
(
 and R
( 8 
Dependent var H  R  
a(    7.940***   (35.4)   40.08***   (33.6) 
Intercept   3.749
*** 
  (40.7) 
  53.52*** 
  (92.6) 
Number of obs 
R-squared 
  684 
  0.648 
  716 
  0.566 
 
After having considered various specifications, we have chosen the following representation for 
the cost functions: 
 
                                                
6 Although, these variables are endogenous to some extent: in particular, there is evidence that institutional quality 
may depend on the level of economic development. 
7 This approach may also partially solve the problem of endogeneity provided that the relative level of development 
mostly affects the trend rather than the deviation of H  and R . The method of estimation is OLS with robust 
8 Here, as usual, t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficients. Asterisks * , **  and ***  mean 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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2
i ai ai Ni Hi Ri Ii Ti Bi Fi Pi iq a a N H R I T B F Pβ β β β β β β β β β βʹ′= + + + + + + + + + +
( ( ( ( ( ( (( %   (40) 
 
(with publications P  standing only in the regression for the innovation cost 2q ). 
 
For a given setting of the parameters, the collection of coefficients 
{ } 1,2, , , , , , , , , ,ai ai Ni Hi Ri Ii Ti Bi Fi Pi i iβ β β β β β β β β β β β =ʹ′=  determining the cost functions is estimated, 
using OLS with White robust standard errors. Thus, we have estimators for the remaining 
parameters of the model. 
 
Now let us describe the last, third stage of the calibration procedure. Given parameters α , 1µ ,  
2µ , ρ  and λ   together with the estimated linear cost functions ( ), , , , , , , ,iq a N H R I T B F P
( ( ( ( ( ( (( , we 
calculate the evolution of the model economic world and compare it to that of the real world. We 
have a sample of 63 countries, for which all necessary data are present. The relative productivity 
level a  is approximated by the fraction 
USA
Aa
A
=
%% %  (with ln( )a a=( % being used in regressions); 
similarly, k  is approximated by Kk
NA
=% %. Thus, under exogenous human capital, each country 
starts from the known pair ( )1981 1981,a k%% . Under endogenous human capital, another phase variable 
H  is added and its initial value is set according to the data. Then, based on the known values of 
, , , , , , , ,a N H R I T B F P
( ( ( ( ( ( (% , we calculate the per-unit costs ( )ˆ , , , , , , , ,i iq q a H N R I T B F P= ( ( ( ( ( ( ((  using 
the least squares method for equation (40). These ˆiq  are substituted instead of iq  into the first-
order conditions (25), (26) for the firm’s optimal innovation-imitation policy 1 2( , )b b , so the 
predicted values iˆb  are derived. In turn, iˆb  determine the predicted values of the imitation and 
innovation growth rates ˆ 1iw − . Note that these predicted values are different from the 
corresponding proxies calculated earlier.  
     Now we just apply the evolution equations for a  and k  to obtain 3ta +  and 3tk + as functions of 
a  and k  (the evolution equations for ). In particular, 3ˆta + , the predicted value of 3ta + , is 
determined as follows: 
 
( ) 1 23 1
1[ ] 2[ ]
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆt t t t t t t t t t tUSA USA
w wa a a N H R I T B F P a
w w+ +
= =
( ( ( ( ( ( (
, 
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where 1981 1981aˆ a= % . In order to check, whether the model is consistent with the reality, we try to 
predict the relative productivity level of countries in 2005, given that in 1981: 
 
( )( )2005 1 1 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981ˆ , , , , , , , ,a a a a N H R I T B F P+ +=
( ( ( ( ( ( (%K K   (8 times) 
 
We do not need to build a prediction for 2005k  because we just have derived a proxy 2005k%  for this 
variable in a similar way using the perpetual inventory estimation method. Now the predicted 
relative per capita GDP 2005yˆ   can be calculated as follows
9: 
 
2005 2005 2005
2005 2005
2005[ ]2005[ ] 2005[ ]
ˆ /ˆ ˆˆ / USAUSA USA
Y N ky a
kY N
α
⎛ ⎞
= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
%% . 
 
We compare the predicted relative per capita GDP to the actual one which is given by 
 
2005 2005
2005
2005[ ] 2005[ ]
/
/USA USA
Y Ny
Y N
=  
 
We choose the basic parameters 1µ ,  2µ , ρ , λ  (only those four, because α  has been already 
estimated) so as to achieve the best prediction, i. e. to minimize the sum of squares of 
logarithmic errors 
 
( )21 2 2005 2005ˆ( , , , ) ln( ) ln( )E y yµ µ ρ λ = −∑ , 
 
where 2005y  and 2005yˆ  are, respectively, the actual and the predicted relative GDP values. The 
objective function is unimodal, so it is easy to find its minimum using the gradient descent 
method.  
    The calibration algorithm looks as follows. We start with some initial combination of 
parameters: 01 1µ µ= ,  
0
2 2µ µ= , 
0ρ ρ= , 0λ λ= . For these values of the parameters, we run the 
regressions for 1q  and 2q , make 8 iterations of the transition function 1 ˆ( , , , , , , , )a a H R T B F Pσ+
( ( ( ( (
 
and calculate 0 0 0 01 2( , , , )E µ µ ρ λ . Then we numerically estimate the gradient of E  at the initial 
                                                
9 The formula for 2005y  relies on the assumption that the innovation and imitation expenditures are negligible when 
comparing to the capital stock. 
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combination of parameters and put 1 0 1 01 1 1, ,
E Ed dµ µ µ λ λ λ
α λ
∂ ∂
= + = +
∂ ∂
K , where increments 
1, ,d dµ λK  are parameters of the procedure chosen heuristically so as to speed up the process of 
convergence. Then the same operation is made with 1 11 1 , ,µ µ λ λ= =K , new values of the 
parameters 2 21 , ,µ λK  are calculated and so on. The process is finished at step j , when the 
difference between ( )1 2, , ,j j j jE µ µ ρ λ  and ( )1 1 1 11 2, , ,j j j jE µ µ ρ λ− − − −  becomes lower than the 
accuracy threshold which is put to be 510− . 
 
6. Calibration of the model: growth-based separation, exogenous human 
capital 
 
As a result of this three-level procedure, we obtain the following best-predictive values of the 
parameters:  
 
0.5003α = ; 
1 0.4477µ =  per three-year period (or 0.1312  per year); 
2 0.2672µ =  per three-year period (or 0.0821  per year); 
0.0493ρ =  per three-year period (or 0.0167  per year); 
3.543λ = . 
Standard error of calibration (average difference ˆ| ln( ) ln( ) |y y− ): 0.0912. 
 
    The estimated parameters of the normalized cost functions 1q  and 2q  are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 confirms, at least partially, our main hypotheses about the absorptive capacity and 
innovative capability (note that the per-unit cost functions 1q  and 2q , respectively, are inversely 
related to these capacities). In particular, other things being equal, more developed countries 
have higher innovation capacity and lower absorptive capacity (this is correct for all countries 
from our sample, even though the functions are quadratic). For poor countries, both indicators 
are less sensitive to changes of the distance to the frontier than for rich ones.  
     The innovative capability is positively related to the size of the country (population). This 
seems natural: larger countries can enjoy economies of scale in the research sector. Note that the 
influence of population on the absorptive capacity is insignificant, so both large and small 
countries can successfully imitate. 
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     Human capital enhances the innovative capability and does not affect significantly the 
absorptive capacity. This does not contradict our hypothesis that imitation is less sensitive to 
educational level. However, it may happen that another indicator – literacy rate – could be more 
appropriate for this case. Unfortunately, we have data on literacy rates only for short period of 
time.   
    Table 2. Regressions for: 1q  and 2q  (growth-based separation, exogenous human capital) 
Dependent var 1q  2q  
a(    0.3317***   (5.13)  –0.1497**  (–2.03) 
2a(    0.05762***   (2.87)  –0.00143  (–0.06) 
N
(
   0.01349   (1.05) 
 –0.04610*** 
 (–3.38) 
H
(
 
 –0.01346 
 (–1.31) 
 –0.03533*** 
 (–3.13) 
R
(
 
 –0.00624** 
 (–2.38) 
 –0.00307 
 (–1.10) 
I
(
 
  0.3492 
  (0.99) 
  2.169*** 
  (5.79) 
T
(
 
 –0.06670** 
 (–2.20) 
 –0.03550 
 (–1.10) 
B
(
 
  0.03903 
  (1.12) 
  –0.01883 
  (–0.49) 
F   –0.00823
 
 (–0.57) 
 –0.00493 
 (–0.32) 
P      N/A  –0.06738
*** 
 (–3.19) 
Intercept   0.5655
*** 
  (2.71) 
  0.8652*** 
  (3.81) 
Number of obs 
R-squared 
  264 
  0.286 
  264 
  0.390 
 
    Institutional quality positively influences the absorptive capacity and is insignificant for the 
innovative capability. This is not contradictory to our hypothesis. 
    In accordance with our hypothesis, the absorptive capacity is positively affected by the 
international trade.  
    The share of investment in GDP does not affect significantly the absorptive capacity and 
negatively affects the innovative capability. The latter effect may occur due to decreasing rate of 
return: the larger innovative efforts already done the more difficult get further positive effect.         
    The impacts of banking system and foreign direct investment are not significant. The 
insignificance of FDI does not contradict to the observation (mentioned in Introduction) that FDI 
influence on rate of growth is mixed. 
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     In accordance with the natural intuition, the number of scientific publications is positively 
related to the innovative capability.   
     Figure 1 demonstrates the quality of the calibration. The model predicts main feature of the 
real evolution of countries distribution by GDP per capita.  However the distribution tail, 
containing four countries in 2006, is not predicted.  The precision of the model may be 
characterized by the following indicator: the standard error of calibration (average 
difference ˆ| ln( ) ln( )y y− ) is equal to  0.0912. This means that having set the correct values of 
relative per capita GDP in 1981, after iterating the step of the dynamic model, we can predict the 
relative per capita GDP in 2005 with an error of about 9% on average. 
                    Figure 1. Evolution of countries distribution 
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7. Calibration of the model with endogenous human capital 
 
    So far we have been doing the calibration based on a simplified version of the model with the 
human capital being an exogenous variable. Now we are going to calibrate the model taking into 
account that human capital is endogenous and its evolution depends on the relative level of 
technology development as supposed in Section 4. 
   As before, we decompose the process of calibration but now there will be one additional stage 
including the calibration of the human capital depreciation rate Hδ , multiplier ( )m a  and the 
education tax rate ( )aτ  determining the evolution of human capital. 
 
First of all, we introduceτ%, a proxy for ( )aτ : 
 
/ED Yτ =% . 
 
Then we calculate m%, a proxy for ( )m a , in accordance with the equation (32) describing the 
evolution of human capital: 
 
3 3 (1 )t t H t t
t
N H N Hm
ED
δ+ + − −=% ,     
 
where Hδ  is the human capital depreciation rate which is to be calibrated. Suppose that Hδ  is 
fixed at some level. Then one can estimate function ( )m a  and ( )aτ  using the following 
regression equations: 
 
2ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) consta am a aβ β ʹ′= + +% % % ,        (41) 
2ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) consta aτ ττ β β ʹ′= + +% % % .        (42) 
 
Then, as ( )m a  and ( )aτ   can be estimated for any given Hδ , we choose such value of Hδ  for 
which the best prediction of H  in the last period is obtained. We start from  (over all 0Hδ ≥ ). 
We obtain 0.0175Hδ =  per three-year period (or 0.00586  per year), with the following 
estimations for (41) and (42). 
Regressions for m% and τ% are given in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Regressions for m% and τ% 
Dependent var m% τ% 
a(   –1.550***  (–19.5)   0.3382***   (6.81) 
2a(   –0.1389***  (–7.59)   0.0432***   (3.73) 
Intercept  –7.901
*** 
  (-128.8) 
 –2.831*** 
 (–79.1) 
Number of obs 
R-squared 
  368 
  0.812 
  368 
  0.236 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, m% is decreasing in a% and τ% is increasing in a% (with both 
dependencies being relatively more sensitive for developed countries) This character of 
dependencies is illustrated by the following pictures: 
 
Figure 2.  
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  The ratio of the “gross” human capital investment to GDP is equal to ( ) ( )m a aτ%%%%. This function 
is a product of a decreasing and an increasing function and summing up the two above 
logarithmic regressions shows that ( ) ( )m a aτ%%%% is decreasing in a%. This dependency is shown in 
Figure 3. 
   The above results show that public spending on education are higher in developed countries 
but the efficiency of each per cent of GDP invested in education is higher in developing  
countries. In other words, public spending on education allows to increase the human capital 
stock in developing countries and only to maintain it in developed countries. This can be thought 
of as one more aspect of the “advantage of backwardness”. 
 
 
Figure 3. 
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   Now, as all the parameters that determine the evolution of human capital are estimated, we can 
calculate the predicted amount of human capital ˆ ( )H a  as a function of the distance to frontier. 
Then we just follow through the second and the third stages of the calibration procedure, with the 
only difference that now ˆ ˆ( )H a  is used instead of H  (in each period, the human capital is 
calculated as a function of the current relative technology level). The results of the calibration 
are as follows: 
 
0.5003α =  (the same as before, since the results of the first stage do not change); 
1 0.4444µ =  per three-year period (or 0.1304  per year); 
2 0.2452µ =  per three-year period (or 0.0758  per year); 
0.0606ρ =  per three-year period (or 0.0206  per year); 
3.124λ = . 
Standard error of calibration (average difference ˆ| ln( ) ln( ) |y y− ): 0.0862  
Comparing these results to the results of calibrating the simplified model shows that the way of 
computing human capital does not matter too much: all the qualitative implications are the same. 
Thus, our way of modeling the process of human capital accumulation is likely to be relevant. 
Note that the accuracy of the calibration has become slightly better comparing to the simplified 
model (standard error 0.0857 versus 0.0881). So, the human capital data implied from the data 
on the education spending is slightly better predictor than the data based on the schooling years 
only.  
 
Table 4. Regressions for: 1q  and 2q  (growth-based separation, endogenous human capital) 
Dependent var 1q  2q  
a(    0.3413***   (5.24)  –0.1831**  (–2.45) 
2a(    0.05912***   (2.92)  –0.00567  (–0.25) 
N
(
   0.01611   (1.25) 
 –0.05149*** 
 (–3.71) 
H
(
 
 –0.01220 
 (–1.18) 
 –0.03619*** 
 (–3.16) 
R
(
 
 –0.00657** 
 (–2.48) 
 –0.00274 
 (–0.97) 
I
(
 
  0.3053 
  (0.86) 
  2.289*** 
  (6.01) 
T
(
 
 –0.06454** 
 (–2.11) 
 –0.03527 
 (–1.08) 
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B
(
 
  0.03902 
  (1.11) 
  –0.02296 
  (–0.59) 
F   –0.00843
 
 (–0.58) 
 –0.00363 
 (–0.23) 
P      N/A  –0.07106
*** 
 (–3.31) 
Intercept   0.5026
** 
  (2.40) 
  0.8730*** 
  (3.79) 
Number of obs 
R-squared 
  264 
  0.293 
  264 
  0.421 
 
  We have also tested other specifications of the regressions excluding or including some factors. 
The results of these tests are similar to those presented in section 5 and 6. In particular, the set of 
significant variables and the signs of their coefficients remain unchanged with varying 
specifications (including the seemingly counter-intuitive results concerning the impact of 
investment, banking and trade). This fact corroborates the robustness of our results. 
 
8. Cost-Based Separation of Imitation and Innovation Growth Effects 
 
   In Sections 5–6, we used formula (37) for separation between the growth due to imitation and 
innovation, based on the hypothesis that the ratio of the growth rates due to imitation and 
innovation is proportional to the ratio of bought and sold licenses, (with λ  being the 
proportionality factor). In this section, we consider an alternative method of estimating the 
contributions of imitation and innovation based on comparing the costs rather than the results of 
these two ways of modernization. So, the following equations are used instead of (37): 
 B
B S
L
L L
ζ
λ
=
+
;  
( )( ) ( )( )1 2 1 1 1 2 2 21 1ww b b b b wψ ψ= + + =% % % %%% %,        (43)          
where 1 1
1 1 2 2
q b
q b q b
ζ =
+
%%% %% %  is the share of the imitation costs in the total costs of imitation and 
innovation. 
   Equation system (43) should be solved with respect to ( )1 2,b b%% , provided that equation system 
(39) holds (recall that (39) is a corollary from the first-order conditions of the optimal choice of 
1b  and 2b ). Putting together (39) and (43), we obtain the following equation with respect to 1w%: 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1 1 2 1
2 1 1 1
11
1 1
w w w w
w w w
µ µζ
ζ µ µ
− + −−
=
− + −
% % % %% % % .        (44) 
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Equation (44) is applicable when  
1 11 1w µ< < +%  and 2 2
1
1 1ww
w
µ< = < +
%% % .       (45) 
The right-hand side of (44) is defined and consistent with (45) for all ( )1 1,w w∈% %, when 
( )1 21 1 min ,w w w< < +% % % .         (46) 
The right-hand side of (44) is +∞  when 1 1w →%  and zero when 1w w→% %. It is easy to show that if 
(46) holds, then the right-hand side of (44) is decreasing in 1w%. Hence, if (46) holds, then (44) 
has a unique solution ( )1 1,w w∈% % for any ( )0,1ζ ∈ . Let us denote this solution as ( )1w ζ% . This is 
an increasing function of ζ  such that ( )1 0 1w =% , ( )1 1w w=% %. For example, if 1 0.3µ = , 2 0.2µ = , 
1.15w =% , then the graph of ( )1w ζ%  under cost-based separation looks like the red curve in 
Figure 4. Note that under growth-based separation, ( )1w ζ%  would be a linear function (see the 
green line). 
The results of the calibration under the cost-based separation and exogenous human capital are 
as follows: 
 
0.5003α =  (the same as before); 
1 0.4364µ =  per three-year period (or 0.1283  per year); 
2 0.2536µ =  per three-year period (or 0.0782  per year); 
0.0500ρ =  per three-year period (or 0.0169  per year); 
1.944λ = . 
Standard error of calibration (average difference ˆ| ln( ) ln( ) |y y− ): 0.0902  
Figure 4. Cost-based vs growth-based separation. 
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Estimated cost functions are presented in Table 5 
Table 5. Regressions for: 1q  and 2q  (cost-based separation, exogenous human capital) 
Dependent var 1q  2q  
a(    0.3563***   (4.85)  –0.2245***  (–3.38) 
2a(    0.06146***   (2.82)  –0.01933  (–0.96) 
N
(
   0.01650   (1.13) 
 –0.05078*** 
 (–4.13) 
H
(
 
 –0.01026 
 (–0.88) 
 –0.04016*** 
 (–3.96) 
R
(
 
 –0.00847*** 
 (–2.84) 
  2.38E–5 
  (0.01) 
I
(
 
  0.3927 
  (0.98) 
  2.157*** 
  (6.39) 
T
(
 
 –0.05279 
 (–1.53) 
 –0.05227* 
 (–1.81) 
B
(
 
  0.03346 
  (0.84) 
  –0.02105 
  (–0.61) 
F   –0.00955
 
 (–0.58) 
 –7.43E–5 
 (–0.01) 
P      N/A  –0.06162
*** 
 (–3.24) 
Intercept   0.4998
** 
  (2.11) 
  0.9333*** 
  (4.57) 
Number of obs 
R-squared 
  264 
  0.255 
  264 
  0.475 
 
If we calibrate the model using endogenous human capital, as in Section 6, then the results will 
be as follows: 
 
0.5003α =  (the same as before); 
1 0.4111µ =  per three-year period (or 0.1216  per year); 
2 0.2527µ =  per three-year period (or 0.0780  per year); 
0.0646ρ =  per three-year period (or 0.0220  per year); 
2.287λ = . 
Standard error of calibration (average difference ˆ| ln( ) ln( ) |y y− ): 0.0854  
Estimated cost functions are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Regressions for: 1q  and 2q  (growth-based separation, endogenous human capital) 
Dependent var 1q  2q  
a(    0.3821***   (5.09)  –0.2470***  (–3.53) 
2a(    0.06575***   (2.83)  –0.01948  (–0.92) 
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N
(
   0.02054   (1.38) 
 –0.05615*** 
 (–4.34) 
H
(
 
 –0.00475 
 (–0.40) 
 –0.04036*** 
 (–3.77) 
R
(
 
 –0.00837*** 
 (–2.76) 
 –0.00021 
 (–0.08) 
I
(
 
  0.1406 
  (0.34) 
  2.335*** 
  (6.56) 
T
(
 
 –0.04535 
 (–1.29) 
 –0.05718* 
 (–1.88) 
B
(
 
  0.03987 
  (0.98) 
  –0.00265 
  (–0.73) 
F   –0.01271
 
 (–0.76) 
 –0.00355 
 (–0.24) 
P      N/A  –0.06769
*** 
 (–3.37) 
Intercept   0.4809
** 
  (1.99) 
  0.9081*** 
  (4.22) 
Number of obs 
R-squared 
  264 
  0.281 
  264 
  0.494 
 
Comparing the regressions using the cost-based separation versus the growth-based separation 
(see Table 7), one can see that basic results remain the same. The only marked difference 
concerns the impact of trade: it affects mainly the imitation cost under growth-based separation 
and the innovation cost under cost-based one. There are also some minor differences concerning 
the significance of relative level of development and investment risks in determining the cost of 
innovation (both are more significant under the cost-based separation).  
 
Table 7. Signs of the coefficients of the cost functions under different specifications 
Specification 
Growth-based 
separation; 
exogenous 
human capital 
Growth-based 
separation; 
endogenous 
human capital 
Cost-based 
separation; 
exogenous 
human capital 
Cost-based 
separation; 
endogenous 
human capital 
Normalized cost of imit. innov. imit. innov. imit. innov. imit. innov. 
Relative level of 
development   +
***   –**   +***   –**   +***   –***   +***   –*** 
Population   0   –***   0   –***   0   –***   0   –*** 
Human capital   0   –***   0   –***   0   –***   0   –*** 
Investment climate   –**   0   –**   0   –***   0   –***   0 
Investment/GDP   0   +***   0   +***   0   +***   0   +*** 
Manufactures Trade   –**   0   –**   0   0   –*   0   –* 
Bank credits   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
Foreign investment   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0 
Scientific papers   N/A   –***   N/A   –***   N/A   –***   N/A   –*** 
 
 
9. Measuring Absorptive Capacity and Innovative Capability 
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   With the calibrated parameters of the model obtained in the previous sections, one can estimate 
the absorptive capacity and innovative capability of various countries using (19). Let us rewrite 
this formula once again: 
            1 10.01(1 ) / ( 0.01(1 ) ), 1,2i i i ic q iα µ µ α
− −= − − − = .                                            (47) 
where 1c  is a measure of the absorptive capacity and 2c  is a measure of innovative capability. 
Note that 1c  and 2c  are proportional to 1q  and 2q , respectively. The proportionality rates are 
chosen so that 1c  is the cost of 1% TFP increase due to technology imitation; this cost is 
normalized to one unit of a country's capital.  The higher is 1c  ( 2c ), the lower is the 
corresponding capacity. 
 
Table 8 presents the estimation of the absorptive capacity 1c  and innovative capability 2c  for the 
countries that are present with all necessary data in our dataset. The countries are sorted 
descending with respect to ln( )y , the logarithm of the per capita GDP relative to USA. These 
data are visualized in Figure 5.   
Table 8. Absorptive capacity, innovative capability and distance to the frontier (cost-based 
separation, endogenous human capital). 
 
Country 1c  2c  ln( )y  Country 1c  2c  ln( )y  
Norway 1.61027 0.75255   0.08390 South Africa 1.38313 1.82299 –1.43651 
USA 2.13453 0.44422   0 Malaysia 0.36721 2.11428 –1.44049 
Canada 1.55905 1.01823 –0.16742 Chile 0.79895 2.00694 –1.44056 
Austria 1.30660 1.58144 –0.18481 Uruguay 0.79608 2.10389 –1.45470 
Netherlands 1.78786 0.76930 –0.18587 Brazil 1.34017 1.80566 –1.46811 
Iceland 0.85811 1.91495 –0.20468 Costa Rica 0.81563 1.98429 –1.59776 
Australia 1.27458 1.50552 –0.21921 Mauritius 0.75257 2.18853 –1.66404 
Singapore 0.64768 1.98433 –0.24323 Peru 0.46808 2.20785 –1.79007 
Belgium 1.71680 0.97481 –0.24740 El Salvador 1.08150 2.08803 –1.97465 
Germany 1.68666 0.97664 –0.26050 Thailand 0.87094 2.27778 –2.02339 
France 1.83925 1.02414 –0.26455 Egypt 0.73985 1.50664 –2.25121 
Sweden 1.98151 0.69034 –0.26807 Bolivia 0.90634 1.17228 –2.29135 
Japan 1.80268 1.33787 –0.26843 Morocco 1.20890 1.65189 –2.46555 
UK 1.98022 0.53408 –0.32463 Philippines 0.71879 2.13033 –2.57250 
Italy 1.44768 1.54921 –0.32660 Indonesia 0.61798 1.46657 –2.68692 
Finland 1.37438 1.18702 –0.35725 Cameroon 1.80071 2.82057 –2.76291 
Greece 0.44558 2.03664 –0.40498 Cote d'Ivoire 1.71099 2.09769 –2.85215 
Ireland 0.60899 1.95720 –0.46243 Pakistan 1.19644 1.40637 –2.96219 
New Zealand 1.23961 1.83888 –0.48147 China 0.21833 1.81270 –3.07968 
Spain 1.16422 1.75872 –0.48483 Kenya 1.05749 1.54699 –3.18759 
Israel 1.84247 0.62119 –0.56670 India 0.49393 1.97389 –3.20465 
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Cyprus 1.38241 0.22017 –0.60226 Madagascar 1.64833 2.13464 –3.59822 
Portugal 1.17906 1.89010 –0.74979 Mali 1.06047 1.74887 –3.69272 
Korea, Rep. 0.89077 1.70664 –1.03238 Bangladesh 0.74676 2.18785 –3.75739 
Mexico 1.47608 1.85397 –1.21137 Rwanda 2.29093 3.41939 –3.88865 
Argentina 2.43126 2.21765 –1.25601 Sierra Leone 0.00055 2.27009 –4.01360 
Russia 1.03613 1.21367 –1.31907 Ethiopia 0.01141 2.25458 –4.18561 
 
   One can see from Table 8 and Figure 5  that in accordance with our main hypothesis, 1c  is 
positively related to the relative level of development, whereas 2c  is negatively related to it, so 
the points in Figure 5 form a downward sloping cloud. The most developed countries (European 
Union, Japan, USA, Canada) have relatively high 1c  (low absorptive capacity) and low 2c  (high 
innovative capability). East Asian countries (China, India, Singapore, Phillipines, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia), along with some European countries (Greece, Ireland) base their growth mainly on 
the absorptive capacity. Rwanda, Cameroon and Argentina spend very much money on each per 
cent of TFP growth, so they are in the upper-right part of Figure 5. Some countries (Cyprus, 
Bolivia, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia)  seem to have unexpectedly low 2c , which may be 
explained by some part of the license receipts possibly irrelevant to the innovation (in particular, 
these licenses may include permits on natural resource extraction or tourism). 
 
Figure 5. Absorptive capacity and innovative capability. 
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   In Figure 5, Russia is disposed to the right of the East Asian countries ant to the left of the 
Western Europe. This means that Russian TFP growth is more oriented to imitation (comparing 
to the developed countries), with innovation still having some impact. One could expect (though 
we have no regular appropriate statistical data) that during the end of the 20-th century, Russia 
(and the former Soviet Union) have been moving from a more right (innovation oriented) 
position to the left. Of course, a significant share of Russian growth can be explained by the fuel 
export which is not included in our simple model. 
 
10. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we develop an approach to the estimation of country absorptive capacities and 
innovative capabilities.  The approach is based on new more precise definitions suggested. 
Therefore, both concepts get clear sense, and it is demonstrated how one can calculate both 
indicators. The method of calculation uses a simple dynamic model and combines calibration 
and econometric approaches. This gives a possibility to analyze how calculated indicators 
depend on different factors. Another important feature of our approach: the estimations are 
conducted not for each country separately but for a group of economies jointly. This gives us 
additional information which is not contained in data on a country alone.  
    There are a lot of possibilities to improve our approach. One could try to use an OLG model 
instead of one period model, and, in an explicit form, include labor markets with workers of 
different qualifications as well as sectors of education and research.  Maybe, even more 
important task is to try different hypotheses to reach the separation of imitation and innovation 
costs and results. In fact, in this paper and in previous one (Polterovich, Tonis (2005)) we use 
different assumptions about connections between costs of imitation and innovations, on one 
hand, and data of royalty payments and receipts, on other hand. Results are similar but not 
exactly the same.  It would be very important to know to what extent the estimations are 
sensitive with respect to model specifications.  
   In any case, we believe the approach developed above may be improved and will be useful for  
economic decision making.   
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